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Abstract 
This comparative report investigates the ways in which the mobility of applicants for international 
protection, beneficiaries of international protection and irregular migrants intersect with the borders 
encountered during their trajectories before, during and after their arrival in six EU countries (Greece, 
Hungary, Germany, Luxembourg, France and Spain) and Turkey. After defining the concept of borders, this 
study contextualises the securitisation of EU external and internal borders, and it provides some 
background information on the CEAS and the Dublin Regulation, which are central to this research. 
Moreover, it engages with the legislative framework in place in the field of asylum in the seven countries 
on which this report draws. Based on qualitative interviews with a total of 96 asylum seekers, refugees 
and irregular migrants, as well as 94 state and non-state actors and ethnographic observation, the 
empirical part of the study explored the following aspects: experiences and conceptualisations of borders; 
mobility patterns and trajectories; the interplay between the Schengen zone and the Dublin system; the 
shortcomings of CEAS; as well as policies and experiences in the fields of housing and employment. The 
main finding of this comparative report is that while territorial borders cannot always impede human 
mobility, they are recreated within countries as administrative borders, which can encourage secondary 
movements.   
Keywords: borders, mobility, asylum seekers, refugees, Schengen Agreement, Dublin Regulation, CEAS, 
EU 
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1. Introduction  
The 2015 ‘migration crisis’ has called into question the framing and implementation of both the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the European Union (EU) and national asylum systems, 
as it has highlighted the lack of harmonisation across EU member-states with regards to legislation and 
asylum process. The Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and 
Recommendations for Further Development (CEASEVAL) project evaluates the ways in which CEAS 
operates in various national contexts by analysing the level of coordination between actors at multiple 
levels and with focus on different perspectives of CEAS.   
In this context, this comparative report sets out to analyse the interactions between borders and the 
mobility of migrants1, informed by seven empirical case studies (Turkey, Greece, Hungary, Germany, 
Luxembourg, France and Spain) which fall under the remit of Work Package 4 (WP4), ‘Borders and the 
mobility of migrants’ of the CEASEVAL project.2. To this effect, this study focuses on how bordering 
processes are implemented in the EU and beyond when confronted with the mobility of migrants at 
different stages, such as interception before entry into the Schengen area (e.g. at sea or in Turkey); 
‘illegal’ entry at external borders; ‘irregular’ transit in the Schengen area; and secondary movements 
across the Schengen zone after making asylum claims or being granted refugee status. More precisely, 
WP4 examines the relationship between migrants’ mobility trajectories and their interaction with EU 
external and internal borders.    
Specific objectives of WP4 are:  
1. To understand the interactions between Schengen and Dublin; 
2. To explore the reasoning behind the participants’ journeys before and in the Schengen 
area; and 
 
1 1 In this research, the term ‘migrants’ encompasses asylum-seekers, refugees and irregular migrants. 
2 The seven country reports, on which this comparative report is based, are available at:  
Aksel, Damla B. İçduygu, Ahmet (2019) ‘Borders and the Mobility of Migrants in Turkey’, CEASEVAL RESEARCH 
ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM, 32. Available at: 
http://ceaseval.eu/publications/32_WP4_Turkey.pdf. 
Beinhorn, J., Gasch, S. and Glorius, B. (2019) ‘Borders and the Mobility of Migrants in Germany’, CEASEVAL 
RESEARCH ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM, 27. Available at: 
http://http//ceaseval.eu/publications/27_WP4_Germany.pdf. 
Bernát, A. et al. (2019) ‘Borders and the Mobility of Migrants in Hungary’, CEASEVAL RESEARCH ON THE 
COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM, 29. Available at: 
http://ceaseval.eu/publications/29_WP4_Hungary.pdf. 
Dimitriadi, A. and Sarantaki, A.-M. (2019) ‘Borders and the Mobility of Migrants in Greece’, CEASEVAL 
RESEARCH ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM, 28. Available at: 
http://ceaseval.eu/publications/28_WP4_Greece.pdf. 
Paraschivescu, C., Nienaber, B. and Oesch, L. (2019) ‘Borders and the Mobility of Migrants in France’, CEASEVAL 
RESEARCH ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM (26). Available at: 
http://ceaseval.eu/publications/26_WP4_France.pdf. 
Paraschivescu, C., Nienaber, B. and Oesch, L. (2019) ‘Borders and the Mobility of Migrants in Luxembourg’, 
CEASEVAL RESEARCH ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM, 30. Available at: 
http://ceaseval.eu/publications/30_WP4_Luxembourg.pdf. 
Sánchez-Montijano, E. and Eitel, K. (2019) ‘Borders and the Mobility of Migrants in Spain’, CEASEVAL RESEARCH 
ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM, 31. Available at: 
http://ceaseval.eu/publications/31_WP4_Spain.pdf. 
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3. To examine the tensions between the determination of responsibility for assessing 
asylum claims and the respondents’ preferences, choices and trajectories within the Schengen 
area. 
Therefore, this study will contribute to advancing the understanding of the interplay between 
migrants’ mobility trajectories and the EU internal and external borders encountered during their 
journeys.  
This research seeks to investigate the border (and the ensuing bordering processes) as a site of control 
and inclusion/exclusion by examining migrants’ journeys and their encounters with borders. 
Distinctions enhanced by the presence of border can take different forms, such as here-there, us-them, 
inclusion-exclusion, self-other and inside-outside (Newman 2006). Immigrants (and even more so 
asylum-seekers, refugees and irregular migrants) are an important case study for the understanding 
of borders and bordering processes, as they are the embodiments of borders and boundaries (Kearney 
1991), since they are constructed as the ‘other’ by national/EU legislation and the mainstream. 
The remaining sections of this chapter contextualise the research by lying out the conceptual and 
methodological dimensions of this study. It is subdivided in three sections. The first section lies out the 
theoretical concepts underpinning this research. The second part is concerned with the methodology 
employed in this study and the limitations experienced by each of the national partners. The third and 
final part introduces the structure of the study. 
 
1.1. Borders – Definition and Operationalisation  
Borders are processes which are produced and reproduced. In the process, they become materialised 
in migrants’ daily lives through the actions of different border managers (border/first reception 
agencies, policymakers/legislators, housing sector/or employment sector actors, etc.), may they be 
public, private or non-governmental. Likewise, Newman (2006:144) holds the view that borders are 
lines of separation between political, social and economic spaces. In this study, we should also add 
legal spaces. For the purpose of this research, geo-political spaces are represented by border agencies, 
legal spaces are represented by policymakers and legislators, social spaces take the form of the 
relations and practices in the housing market, while economic spaces refer to the actors involved in 
the labour market.  
In this context, this research is interested in the ways in which borders at various levels (political, legal, 
economic and social) influence migrants’ mobility before, during and after arrival in the host country 
(i.e. Germany, Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Greece, Luxembourg and France). As such, by focusing on the 
interrelations between border studies and mobility studies, this WP brings together two fields which 
have rarely been studied together, particularly when confronted to asylum seekers and refugees. This 
is of particular interest both empirically (given the flows of people arriving in Europe) and conceptually 
(as bordering practices relate to both practices of mobility and border making, as well as border 
crossing, from an institutional and experiential perspective). Therefore, the fieldwork focused on the 
ways in which the mobility of migrants influences the creation of (new) borders through bordering 
practices, and how these borders and bordering practices, in turn, affect the management of mobility 
and thus peoples’ migratory trajectories. 
A considerable amount of literature has investigated the issue of borders (e.g. Agnew 1987, Newman 
and Paasi 1987, Newman 2006b, Mezzadra 2015, Walters 2006b). According to Walters (2006), there 
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are three imaginings of borders in Europe. The first one refers to the emergence of the European 
external frontier and it reflects the emergence of Europe as a nation-state. This is equally supported 
by studies which suggest that more than half of the deaths taking place at borders in the past ten years 
occurred at the edge of the EU, which makes it the most dangerous border crossing in the world (Jones 
2017:16). For the second imagining, Walters borrows the concept of ‘gated community’ from Pijpers 
and van Houtum (2005) over that of fortress Europe. This term allows the homeowner-citizen a 
market-driven conception of security, which operates through the strategic and defensive organisation 
of space and enacts both the policing of migrants and the creation of social boundaries migrants are 
subject to. This concept emphasises that borders are not just a set of policies, but that they are part of 
social, cultural and symbolic fields; it is a reminder of the geopolitical and socioeconomic relations that 
borders cause, and as such they cannot be dissociated from these (Walters 2006:150). The third vision 
of the border is that of a firewall. By using this metaphor, Walters wishes to draw our attention to the 
fact that borders do not always coincide with state frontiers, they are not walls designated to stop 
trespassers, although fences and walls become more and more common (Collyer and King 2016). 
Rather, they are dynamic processes taking the form of filters, which “aspire to reconcile high levels of 
circulation, transmission and movement with high levels of security” (Walters 2006:152). 
Nevertheless, what all these three aspects have in common, is that they all understand borders as 
barriers to human mobility which visibilise migratory movements.  
The term ‘border’ embodies two main concepts. These are borders as territorial frontiers and 
boundaries, as internal social categorisations (Fassin 2011). This view is supported by Yuval-Davis 
(2013), who stresses that borders are of a dual nature: state boundaries and symbolic, social and 
cultural frontiers of inclusion and exclusion. Importantly, symbolic borders are the recreation of state 
borders, highlighting who is (not) allowed to be in a given space. She states that borders are thereby 
conceptualised as “practices that are situated and constituted in the specificity of political negotiations 
as well as the everyday life performance of them, being shifting and contested between individual and 
groupings as well as in the constructions of individual subjectivities” (Yuval-Davis 2013:15). In a similar 
vein, Balibar (2002:84-85) refers to the “ubiquity of borders”, in that borders are not disappearing, 
rather, they are becoming “a grid ranging over the new social space” instead of being territorial borders 
outside the nation-state. In this respect, borders have been transferred into the middle of the political 
space (Balibar 2009:109). 
Following this line of thought, land borders are “a continuous line demarcating the territory and 
sovereign authority of the state, enclosing its domain and protecting its population” (Walters 
2006:145). It is a land line marking the end of a territory and of its jurisdictional authority. The role of 
border institutions is significant in the governing of migrants’ mobility and their ability to cross the 
border and be allowed entry on the other side of the state (Newman 2003:14). This reflects the 
inclusionary and exclusionary roles of border agencies and their governing of migrants’ daily 
experiences on the new territory. More precisely, borders  present a dual status, that of nation-state 
borders, often materialised into border institutions and that of entry points into society, represented 
by the documents one needs in order to become a part of society, such as access to housing or 
employment (Walters 2006). In other words, “[b]oundaries controlled by civil servants at the local scale 
are also part of the (re)construction of the external nation-state borders, and adds to the ongoing 
criminalization of migrants” (ibid:546). As such, they represent exclusionary mechanisms meant to 
categorise and differentiate between people.  
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Nevertheless, while border controls are now intensified through various materialities (such as physical 
frontiers), they have also become prolific in identity politics. Control mechanisms of migration have 
thus moved from the outskirts of the territory towards covering the whole territory, represented by 
the societal level. The focus has thus become twofold: territorial, at the edge of the nation-state, and 
the politics of boundary production, within the nation-state, leading to the creation of internal borders 
(Bendixsen 2016:541). To put it differently, borders are temporal, spatial and social and are 
experienced differently by people depending on their legal status, race, ethnicity, gender, age etc. 
In this respect, this research agrees with Newman (2006:148), who argues “borders create (or reflect) 
difference and constitute the separation line not only between states and geographical spaces, but 
also between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ‘here’ and ‘there’ and the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’”. Moreover, 
migrants are surrounded by borders in their everyday lives, which are enacted by various individual 
actors and institutions and which may allow or prevent migrants from crossing these barriers. As such, 
borders can often be felt more intensely in migrants’ daily lives rather than at the point of border-
crossing. In parallel, the transformation of public and private spaces in border zones is the product of 
an assemblage of governmental and non-governmental actors involved in migration management 
(Dines et al 2015:436), which will be further explored with reference to the housing and labour sectors 
in the final part of this study. 
For the purpose of this research, ‘borders’ are defined as the physical state frontiers the migrants first 
cross when they enter a new territory. The term ‘boundaries’ will be used solely when referring to the 
social and economic barriers that migrants are affected by in their daily lives depending on the lines of 
exclusion they are subject to, such as legal status, gender, age, race, ethnicity etc. However, it is worth 
noting that both physical borders and social boundaries affect social relations and contribute to 
migrants’ inclusion/exclusion in the receiving country. Since borders categorise and differentiate 
people on the basis of their social locations, this research understands borders are social signifiers. 
This suggests that the conceptualisation of migration is inseparable from the conceptualisation of 
borders as social constructs. This is due to migrants’ lived experiences within the context of inclusion 
and exclusion. 
Borders are widespread in our daily praxis and they rely on the spatial and socio-cultural differentiation 
of the others. They are performative and thus better captured by the processual verb ‘bordering’. 
In this report (and in the research conducted in WP4), the terms bordering process and/or bordering 
practices mean the spatial, legal, economic and social progression which migrants might go through in 
the countries of transit and/or receiving countries, and the barriers they might or might not experience 
during their interactions with state and non-state actors. The main focus of the WP is on the spatial 
and legal levels, but it will also go beyond and consider the economic and social levels.  
The bordering process is present at multiple stages in the trajectories of migrants and is multi-level: 
arrival into a country (e.g. interactions with border agency), reception (e.g. short-term 
accommodation, administrative processes), settlement (e.g. long-term accommodation, labour 
market integration) and further mobilities (e.g. secondary movements). Building upon Newman and 
Paasi (1998) and Newman’s (2006:144) work, this research indicates that the bordering process is more 
significant than the border per se in migrants’ daily lives. It is exactly the bordering practices which 
refer to the ways in which borders are delimited and managed, that is significant to the understanding 
of borders as both a process and as an institution (Newman 2006:148).  
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1.2. Methodological considerations  
In order to investigate the interplay between mobility and borders, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews and, where possible, ethnographic observation were employed in the fieldwork conducted 
by the national partners involved in WP4.  
The role of the interviews and ethnography is twofold: to address the meaning of borders and 
bordering processes as well as that of mobility for both migrants and officials at different stages 
(interception and smuggling outside EU borders, ‘illegal’ entry at external borders, crossing and 
reintroduction of internal borders). As such, the meaning of specific episodes and phenomena is of 
interest to this project, such as interactions during border crossings and inclusion/exclusion in the 
‘host’ and/or ‘transit’ country. WP4 interprets the interplay of processes of inclusion and exclusion to 
refer to the politics of belonging, defined as “the dirty work of boundary maintenance” (Crowley 
1999:30) which separates the population between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  
In-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted in order to understand the social and 
political world from the research participants’ points of view and to unfold the meaning of their 
experiences, be that professional or personal. The empirical component of WP4 relied on the use of: 
- A total of 96 semi-structured qualitative interviews with migrants (across the three following 
groups: asylum seekers, refugees and/or irregular migrants – such as migrants who have lost their 
asylum status and are in limbo at the time of the interview) who have arrived in the host country after 
2014. The interviews reflected the diversity of the population in terms of nationality, ethnicity and 
gender.  
- A total of 94  semi-structured qualitative interviews with institutional actors (state, non-state 
and/or international actors). The institutional actors interviewed by each national partner are listed in 
the table below. 
Table 1 Breakdown of state and non-state actors interviewed per country 
 
 
Border 
agents 
Policy makers/civil 
servants/ Legislators at 
EU/national/regional/local 
level 
Representatives 
of the housing 
and labour 
market 
Civil 
society/International 
organisation actors 
Turkey 8 6 2 0 
Greece 5 1 5 1 
Germany 1 5 0 8 
Luxembourg 2 9 4 2 
France 0 3 0 7 
Spain 7 3 6 0 
Hungary  0 6 0 3 
 
Access was not always granted for the national partners to conduct interviews with some institutional 
actors, which, in some cases also resulted in no access to conduct ethnographic observation. Such is 
the case of the fieldwork conducted in France, where access was not granted to state representatives, 
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such as the border police. Hungary is another case where conducting ethnographic observation, as 
well as carrying out interviews was deemed challenging. Since October 2015, Hungary has witnessed 
the modification of the Penal Code, which, among other changes, banned individuals and NGOs from 
either providing information to asylum seekers or approaching the border zone, at the risk of incurring 
a one year imprisonment charge. This, together with the introduction of the martial law due to mass 
influx in 2015, supposed to end in September 2019, which gives extra powers to the police and military 
to conduct border checks and use fire arms in the surveillance of the state border, meant that 
ethnographic observation was not achieved at Hungarian borders, and access to institutional actors as 
well as migrants was limited. In the Greek case, the Ministry of Migration Policy denied access to the 
hotspots or to conduct interviews with policymakers within the ministry itself. Moreover, the timing 
of the research coincided with the vote on the name of North Macedonia, which meant that many 
Greek MPs were unavailable to take part in the research. In contrast, in Luxembourg, the main 
challenge encountered during the research consisted of recruiting migrants, and even more so, female 
migrants, the latter being also reported by the German and Greek partners.  
Ethnographic observation is a qualitative research method where researchers observe and/or interact 
with the participants taking part in the research in their real-life. The interaction with the field is of 
particular interest, as it allows researchers to get close to people and observe what they do, rather 
than just reporting what the respondents say about their experiences (see Gans 1999). Where possible, 
CEASEVAL implemented ethnographic observation to support a deeper understanding of the diverse 
perspectives and practices of actors involved in bordering processes, and the interplay between them. 
Ethnographic observation was made mainly amongst border agencies and airports (Luxembourg and 
Greece), but also at borders (such as the Turkish-Greek border on the Aegean sea) and the police 
agencies (National Police Office in Barcelona).  
Furthermore, it was concluded that the ethnographic observation was rather limited in scope due to 
the irregular nature of asylum seekers’ border crossings. As such, while the activities of border agents 
were observed at the Luxembourgish airport or at the Turkish-Greek sea border, the handling of 
applicants for international protection was not studied due to the irregularity of their actual border 
crossings, which did not happen during the time the national teams were conducting fieldwork.  
1.3. Structure 
The overall structure of the study takes the form of seven chapters. The following chapter (Chapter 
two) engages briefly with the state of the art of the EU framework with regards to borders and asylum, 
as well as the asylum legislation in the countries in which fieldwork has been conducted. Chapter three 
highlights the meanings attributed to borders by state actors, as well as migrants’ experiences of 
border-crossings. The fourth chapter analyses the results of the empirical research with regards to the 
notion of mobility, while chapter five will consider how the Dublin and Schengen systems interact in 
each of the countries studied. Chapter six will provide evidence of the barriers encountered by 
migrants in accessing housing and employment. Finally, the seventh and last chapter discusses the 
overall findings and conclusion of the research.  
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2. European and national contexts  
2.1. Introduction 
This section aims at contextualising the empirical data analysed in the following three chapters.  
Therefore, the main topics covered in this chapter are the management of EU borders, the CEAS and 
the legislation in place as well as the main countries of provenience of the asylum seekers in the seven 
countries which form the basis of this comparative study.  
2.2. The management of European Union borders 
EU external border areas are as follows: Eastern Europe land border, Southern Europe sea and land 
border, Mediterranean and Western border and international airports. EU internal borders refer to 
the common land borders of EU Member States, the airports of EU countries for internal flights, as 
well as the sea, river and lake ports for EU State ferry connections (European Commission n.d).  
According to a briefing issued by the European Parliament, the role of the European Union in the 
context of external border protection is to “safeguard the freedom of movement within the Schengen 
area, an area without internal borders, and to ensure efficient monitoring of people who cross both 
external Schengen borders, as well as the EU's external borders with countries that are not part of the 
Schengen area” (Radjenovic 2019:2). The Schengen Borders Code brings together the rules on external 
border crossings, entry requirements, as well as allowed duration of stay in the Schengen area. 
Moreover, it brings in border controls for people crossing EU’s external borders (EU nationals included) 
at entry and exit (ibid.). 
The Central authority of EU’s border management is the European Border and Coast Guard, which 
includes the European Border and Coast Guard agency (FRONTEX), as well as the national authorities 
of Member States. The summer of 2015 represented an important period in the management of the 
EU’s external borders, due to the numbers of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU (over 1.2 million 
applications submitted). This led to the reintroduction of internal borders between EU Member States 
(as evidenced by Hungary, France and Germany in this report), a capability provided by the Schengen 
Borders Code. The Schengen system functions in theory on the supposition that a free movement zone 
can only perform well if the external borders are protected.   
Moreover, centralised information systems are also in place and used by both Member States and EU 
agencies in the field of security, border and migration management, such as the Schengen Information 
System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), as well as the European fingerprint database 
(EURODAC). The SIS provides information on wanted missing people, as well as lost or stolen objects, 
such as identification documents. The purpose of VIS is to enable border guards to verify if visa holders 
are indeed the persons who initially applied for the visas. The main aim of EURODAC is to facilitate the 
application of the Dublin Regulation, by assisting with the identification of applicants for international 
protection and third-country nationals apprehended crossing the external border illegally, or found to 
be staying irregularly on the territories of EU Member States (European Commission n.d). Where 
possible, before making a EURODAC check, national institutions undertake a fingerprint comparison 
against the VIS. 
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2.3. The Common European Asylum System  
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) goes back to 1999, when EU member states decided to 
set up a standard for harmonising asylum systems in Europe. Despite this, EU countries have followed 
unilateral measures to tackle the influx of asylum seekers on their territories. CEAS is comprised of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualifications Directive, the 
Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation (European Union 2014). The CEAS has proved ineffective 
in creating a convergent mechanism of granting asylum applicants (ie The Qualification Directive), with 
individuals of the same nationality receiving different forms of international protection, depending on 
the country in which they apply for asylum, which affects the type of rights they are entitled to (Crepin 
2015). Another set of challenges consists of the differences in reception conditions, as well as 
processing times and access to social rights. 
Although not all EU Member States are part of both systems, a key aspect of CEAS is the way in which 
the Dublin Regulation and the Schengen Agreement act on each other, as both have come under 
considerable pressure following the migratory events during the summer of 2015. The 2015 ‘migration 
crisis’ revealed that the states located at EU’s external borders (namely Greece and Italy), which were 
the main entry points of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU, were left with a disproportionate 
share of responsibility with regards to the processing of asylum claims. This triggered secondary 
movements to Western and Northern European countries. Nonetheless, it is important to mention 
that the Dublin system was never intended to include mechanisms of solidarity-sharing, which points 
to a structural flaw which needs to be addressed. The efforts undergone by EU Member States, as well 
as the actions coordinated by the European Commission and EU agencies in the areas of both solidarity 
and responsibility-sharing mechanisms are further explored in Work Package 6 of CEASEVAL, 
Rethinking solidarity: from lip service to good service (see Baumgartner and Wagner 2018 and Wagner 
et al 2018).  
The Dublin System of the CEAS was established by the Dublin Convention in 1990, and it was replaced 
in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation. In 2013, the Dublin III Regulation was adopted, and it is currently 
still in force. It outlines criteria for determining which Member State is responsible for examining 
individual asylum applications, by taking into account a variety of criteria such as family unity, 
possession of residence documents or visas, irregular entry or stay, and visa-waived entry (Radjenovic 
2019b). In practice, “the most frequently applied criterion is the irregular entry, meaning that the 
Member State through which the asylum-seeker first entered the EU is responsible for examining his 
or her asylum claim.” (ibid:2). Therefore, migrants’ ‘deservingness’, is assessed on the basis of their 
migratory trajectories from their home countries to the receiving countries (see also Sigona 2018), 
hence the importance of studying migrants’ mobility patterns. The aim of the Dublin system is twofold: 
to avoid people applying for asylum in the country of their choice (referred to as ‘asylum shopping’), 
or being in the EU without any Member State examining their asylum application (see Garces-
Mascarenas 2015).  
The Dublin Package has been unfit since 2015 due to the unprecedented numbers of arrivals mainly 
by boat, which means that the reception capacities of Greece and Italy became overwhelmed. 
Furthermore, Germany suspended the Dublin procedure for Syrian citizens, thus becoming responsible 
for processing their claims. However, shortly after, border controls were reintroduced at the German 
- Austrian border. In the same year, Austria, Slovenia, France, Hungary, Sweden and Norway 
introduced internal border checks. Denmark and Belgium followed in 2016. Currently, the following 
EU Member States have reintroduced temporary border controls, which are due to end in November 
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2019: Norway at all its internal borders; Sweden (potentially) at all its internal border; Denmark at its 
border with Germany (land and ports with ferry connections), although it may extend to all internal 
borders; Germany at its land border with Austria; Austria at its land borders with Hungary and Slovenia 
and France at its internal borders (European Commission n.d b).  
At this stage, the question that arises is how long these border controls will continue to exist, in a zone 
which is characterised by the absence of border checks, curtailing therefore the free movement of 
both European and non-European citizens alike, which calls into question the core of the European 
integration project, that of the free movement of citizens. The above countries justify the maintenance 
of border controls on the basis of the risk posed by the secondary movements of asylum claimants and 
refugees, since most of the applicants for international protection are still in Greece, the presence of 
whom cannot be addressed by Dublin without it being reformed following the principle of 
responsibility-sharing, as previously argued (Somer 2018).  
2.4. Country Breakdown 
Greece 
Greece is signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Protocol (1967), as well as the 
European Convention of Human Rights (1950). The legislation on CEAS has been incorporated into the 
national legislation via the Law 3386/2005, which focuses on the reception of asylum seekers, asylum 
procedures and family reunification. With regards to asylum applications, the main authorities are the 
Ministry of Migration Policy, created in 2016 (the Asylum Service, the Reception and Identification 
Service, the Appeals Authority) and the Administrative Court of Appeal.  
The top three citizenships of first-time asylum applicants in Greece in 2018 were Syrians, Iraqis and 
Afghans. 
Germany 
After their registration of asylum seekers by the Federal police at the border or by state police or 
authorities on German territory, asylum seekers are placed in initial reception facilities for the first 
few months, time during which they cannot go to school or engage in any professional activity. Then, 
they are relocated to German States, based on a quota. Here, they are given accommodation in 
initial reception centres and start the asylum procedure, carried out by the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees, under the legislation in place (German Basic Law, the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees and the Asylum law). Once the asylum application is finalised, they are usually redistributed 
to municipalities. The refugees’ mobility within Germany is somewhat limited, with States or 
counties having the ability to impose restrictions on refugees’ changes of residency. These 
restrictions can be lifted if one needs to move to take up job opportunities.  
In 2018, the three main nationalities of applicants for asylum were Syrians, Iraqis and Iranians. 
Hungary 
Hungary is signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Protocol (1967), as well as 
the European Convention of Human Rights (1950). There are three relevant pieces of national 
legislation in the field of asylum.  Firstly, according to the Fundamental Law, since 2018, one cannot 
be recognized as a refugee if they arrived in Hungary via a safe country or if they can get international 
protection in a different country responsible for the asylum procedure. Secondly, the Act on Asylum 
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has limited the procedural guarantees and reception conditions. Thirdly, the State Border Act, has 
authorised the creation of the Hungarian fence which impedes migrants from arriving in Hungary.  
The central authority in asylum matters (such as the management of refugee reception shelters, 
asylum applications and checks of migrants, in cooperation with the police) is the Office of Immigration 
and Asylum, within the Ministry of Interior, which opened its doors in January 2000.  
Top three nationalities between 2014 and 2018 were Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians.  
Luxembourg 
The current asylum legislation was introduced in 2015, transposing two European Directives into 
national law, regarding the granting and withdrawing of international protection, and detailing the 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection. The asylum process begins on 
the premises of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, and it consists of the filing, registering 
and lodging of the application.  
The three main nationalities of asylum seekers in 2018 are Eritreans, Syrians and Iraqis.  
France 
The French asylum legislation sits within the framework of the 2019 Asylum Law. According to one of 
the main changes introduced, rejected asylum seekers who arrived in France after the 1st of January 
2019 are not allowed to apply for a residence permit on health grounds any longer. Rather, the 
application for a residence permit for medical reasons should be lodged at the same time as the asylum 
application. The process for lodging an asylum claim is comprised of three stages: 1) the initial 
reception, provided by actors of the civil sector, 2) the recording of the asylum at the ‘single desk’ in 
the Préfecture and 3) the decision on the asylum claim, made by Office Français de Protection des 
Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA). 
The top three sending countries to France in 2018 were Afghanistan, Albania and Georgia. In Metz, 
however, the largest group is represented by people from the Balkans (mainly Albania).  
Spain 
The asylum and subsidiary protection legislative framework in place is the Law 12/2009 of 30 October 
2009, amended by Law 2/2014 of 25 March 2014. The main institutions in the field of asylum are the 
Office of Asylum and Refuge (ORA), within the Ministry of Interior, and the General Direction of 
Migration (GDM), in charge with two distinct stages of asylum. ORA is responsible for the processing 
of asylum applications, while GDM’s duties are in the area of the reception and integration of 
international protection applicants and beneficiaries.  
The top three nationalities in 2018 for asylum applications were Venezuela, Columbia and Syria.  
Turkey 
Turkish asylum and migration policy is framed by the Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International 
Protection, which has been in place since 2014. Despite being a signatory of the 1951 UN Geneva 
Convention on the Status of Refugees and its Additional Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees of 
1967, Turkey presents a ‘geographical limitation’, which only allows European citizens to have refugee 
status granted. The authority processing asylum applications is the Provincial Directorate of Migration 
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Management (PDMM), operating locally under the Directorate General for Migration Management. 
Asylum applications cannot be lodged at the Turkish border, but within country, to PDMM. 
The three main nationalities for first instance asylum applications are Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis, with 
Syrians being entitled to a special Temporary Protection status.  
2.5. Conclusion 
Despite the Schengen area being a zone characterised by the absence of internal borders, it has been 
identified that several EU countries have suspended the Schengen agreement and put in place border 
controls as mainly a result of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. In this context, the CEAS, and more generally 
the Dublin Regulation have come under criticism as a result of the absence of mechanisms of solidarity 
and responsibility which would take the burden of the countries located at the external border of the 
EU, such as Italy and Greece.  
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that, with the exception of France, Syria ranked amongst the top 
three sending countries of asylum applicants in all of the seven national case studies conducted 
between April 2018 and May 2019. Not unsurprisingly, in Greece and Germany, Syrians represent the 
largest number of first time asylum applicants. Spain is the only country where the greatest proportion 
of asylum seekers came from Latin America. One of the issues that emerges is that the interaction 
between borders and the mobility of the migrants might differ amongst the countries under study, due 
to the diversity of their countries of origin and thus the different mobility trajectories undertaken.  
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3. Experiences and conceptualisations of borders  
3.1. Introduction 
After having contextualised the formal management of EU and national borders, this chapter 
provides important insights into the concept of borders, as an experienced reality from the 
perspective of applicants for and beneficiaries of international protection. Their lived experiences are 
complemented by the understanding of borders by institutional actors, such as border agents and 
national legislators, or representatives of the civil society. More precisely, it examines the meanings 
attributed to borders by the respondents interviewed. Across all the national case studies, it 
emerged that two types of borders were experienced by asylum seekers and refugees throughout 
their mobility trajectories, namely territorial and administrative borders.  
3.2. Maritime borders 
Within the EU national case studies, Greece and Spain represent the external border to the EU, 
making them the ‘gatekeepers’ of the Schengen area, and they present the most convoluted system 
of borders amongst the six EU countries under study.   
The external dimension of Greece takes, in practice, the form of hotspots. The hotspot approach, 
based at the external borders of the EU in Greece and Italy, consists of ”facilities for initial reception, 
identification, registration and fingerprinting of asylum-seekers and migrants arriving in the EU by 
sea” Mentzelopoulou and Luyten 2018:2)  at the external borders of the EU in Greece and Italy. Here, 
“the EU aims to better coordinate European aid in areas with high migratory pressure. In addition, 
hotspots also serve to channel newly-arrived people into procedures such as international protection 
or return“ (ibid.).  
During the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, most Syrians reached Greece through the maritime border with 
Turkey. However, following the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, another maritime border emerged, 
represented by the islands situated in the Aegean sea, at the Greek-Turkish border, aimed at 
stopping migrants’ migratory movements to the Greek mainland and, ultimately, the Schengen area. 
This resulted into the Evros land route being privileged over the sea route, for safety concerns, as 
shown later. Only beneficiaries of international protection and those exempt from migration 
procedures on the basis of vulnerable status and/or family reunification are allowed to leave the 
islands. The securitisation of the maritime border with Italy (Ionian-Adriatic sea), which acts as a 
transit exit route to Italy and as a result to the Schengen area has translated into increased security 
checks at the ports of Patras and Igoumanitsa. Thus, many migrants became unable to continue their 
journey to Italy, transforming Greece from a transit country to a country of destination.  
The securitisation of Greek sea borders stands in contrast with the situation at the Spanish maritime 
borders, which might be attributed to the low numbers of arrivals in Spain via the maritime route. As 
far as the maritime borders are concerned, they are represented by the mainland ports and the 
Spanish coast. While the number of entries at the mainland ports is unknown, as many people enter 
Spain irregularly, and they are not registered, however it is considered to be relatively low. With 
regards to the Spanish coast, the arrival of migrants takes place in Canary Islands, Balearic Islands, 
Ceuta, Melilla, or at the sea, where boats are intercepted. Until 2016, this migratory practice tended 
to be considered irregular, which meant that migrants were sent back to their country of origin, or to 
the last country of transit, which used to be Morocco. Since 2016, when cases of international 
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protection have been detected, migrants have been informed about the possibility of lodging an 
application for international protection, and have been transferred to first reception centres.  
3.3. Air borders 
Most of the asylum seekers enter the EU by land or sea, with airports receiving low numbers of 
applicants for international protection. For example, Luxembourg, a land locked country in the 
Schengen area, presents only one external border, at the Findel airport, where the Border Control 
Unit of the Police operate. The only flight outside of the EU landing in Luxembourg which is 
considered a ‘vol à risque’, based on a risk analysis done by FRONTEX, is the Turkish Airlines flight 
from Istanbul. As explained by border agents, passengers on the Turkish Airlines flight are likely to 
claim asylum, although the chances are slim, with only seven people having claimed asylum at the 
airport in 2017.  
Contrary to all the countries under study, in Spain, most asylum seekers arrive by plane (at Barajas 
Airport in Madrid and El Prat Airport in Barcelona) from Central and Southern America. Since these 
nationals do not need a visa to enter the Schengen zone at the moment, they submit their asylum 
application from within the Spanish territory (in police stations, immigration offices or in Office of 
Asylum and Refuge (OAR offices), rather than at the airport. Nevertheless, it is likely that this pattern 
will change in 2021, when Venezuelans will be required to apply for a European Travel Information 
and Authorisation System visa online before travelling to Schengen countries.  
3.4. Material borders  
Within the Hungarian context, the fence built at the Serbian and Croatian borders, is the most 
material representation of EU borders (with the exception of the Spanish Ceuta and Melilla border 
fence, on African continent). Since most arrivals have taken place at the Hungarian-Serbian border, 
the fence represents both a physical and a symbolical border which aims at keeping the migrants out 
and at protecting the Hungarian nation from strangers. Unsurprisingly the institutional actors 
conceptualisation of borders is in the form of the fence at the Southern border, which, according to 
some actors, is efficient in ‘defending’ both Hungary and the EU from irregular migrants.  
Material representations of borders are also present in the Turkish case. As a result of negotiations 
with and the support of the EU, Turkey is undertaking an increasing number of actions to strengthen 
the control of its borders through the raising of material barriers, such as walls and fences. These 
borders are moving towards Turkey’s Eastern borders with Syrian, Iran, Iraq, Armenia and Georgia, as 
it has already been the case for Greece and Bulgaria. The creation of walls is responsible for both 
preventing peoples’ entry in and exist from Turkey, with migration becoming more permanent, as it 
stops people from engaging in circular migration.  
3.5. Border timing 
Depending upon the political circumstances at the time of arrival, timing is crucial in the ways in 
which borders come into existence and are experienced by those trying to cross them.  
In the German case, since the country is part of the Schengen area and it is surrounded by countries 
belonging to the Schengen area, the only borders where stationary controls exist, in ‘normal 
circumstances’, at the airports (where most migrants used to arrive before 2015) and sea borders. 
Dragnet controls are deployed by the federal police within a thirty kilometre area of land borders, 
where suspicious vehicles can be stopped and checked, or train passengers have their identification 
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checked. However, as a result of the large numbers of asylum seekers arriving in 2015, Germany first 
decided to be the country responsible with examining the asylum claims of the Syrians crossing its 
borders although the first country of entry was Greece. Then, it reintroduced border controls at all its 
land borders for six months, with controls at the Austrian-Bavarian border being extended until 
further notice. Indeed, in 2015, 81% of migrants crossed the Austrian-German border, as opposed to 
5% who arrived via air borders, and 5% via the German border with the Czech Republic.  
The opening and closing of borders by Germany had effects on Greece, with regards to both the 
routes chosen by asylum seekers to head out of the country, and/or their decisions to remain in 
Greece. As such, in late 2015 and 2016, as Germany opened its borders, the Greek internal land 
border with North Macedonia started to gain in importance, as migrants started to head to Germany 
from Greece. However, as they closed, and the hotspot approach came in, it started to lose its 
significance, resulting in some migrants staying in Greece, rather than attempting to continue their 
journeys to the rest of the Schengen area. This shows that the closing of some routes at the external 
borders as well as border management can prevent secondary movements, which results into 
traditionally transit countries becoming countries of destination. Similarly, the land border with 
Turkey (the ‘Evros route’) was often chosen by migrants in the research either after failed attempts 
via the sea border, or on safety grounds, given the detention facilities on the Greek islands, 
introduced as a result of the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement.  
At the very beginning of the war in Syria, Turkey put into practice an open-door policy, allowing 
Syrians to enter the country without needing a visa. This situation enabled some Syrians to even 
reside in Turkey for safety reasons, while engaging in cross-border movement to Syria for 
professional reasons. However, in January 2016, a more stringent border regime was introduced, 
reflecting that borders are time dependent, rather than reflecting social categories (such as ethnicity, 
social class, nationality, vulnerability), with Syrians trying to reach Turkey post 2016 having had to 
pay in order to get a Turkish visa, or seek smugglers’ help. The same applies for other nationalities, 
such as Afghans, Iraqis or Somalians, who need an entry visa to Turkey.   
Not only does timing influence mobility trajectories, but it is significant in the ensuing experiences of 
border-crossings. Such is the case in the Hungarian context, where migrants arriving in early 2015 
recalled an uneventful border crossing into Hungary, characterised by welcoming police and the 
absence of a fence (in contrast to Macedonia, were the border police was impeding their mobility). In 
contrast, those having arrived from late 2015 onwards mentioned extremely unpleasant experiences, 
namely due to tight security at the border and the violence of the border police, rather than the 
fence itself.  
3.6. Borders as mechanisms of control 
In many cases, physical borders are experienced by applicants for international protection as 
mechanisms of control. Their main role is that of preventing their mobility throughout their 
trajectories before crossing into the receiving country, mainly with reference to maritime borders or 
embodied representations, such as border agents.  
For example, in terms of physical borders, they emerge as obstacles outside of Europe, and they take 
the form of the sea (Aegean sea and the Mediterranean sea), which were crossed by migrants with 
the help of smugglers in order to get to Germany. In Europe, state borders are experienced through 
the medium of police and security measures, which impede or allow mobility, thus determining their 
migratory trajectories. Indeed, it was reported that some migrants were told by police in Greece, 
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Hungary and Italy that they had to leave the countries. For example, an Eritrean asylum seeker 
residing in France commented that in Italy (the first country of arrival), he was given a piece of paper 
by the Italian police, mentioning that he had to leave the country within 24 hours. As such, border 
agents emerge not only as stopping mobility, but also as encouraging it.  
For the migrants interviewed, crossing into Germany was not experienced as a major obstacle. 
Furthermore, once in Germany, most of the migrants interviewed made contact with the police in 
order to get registered. Rather, the physical and social borders during their migratory trajectories on 
their way to Germany and within the country itself, were more significant, than the experience of the 
border at the point of entry into the country. Other than the  territorial demarcations that migrants 
have to cross before arriving in Germany (namely the perilous maritime borders), in Germany, 
migrants are confronted to various obstacles. For example, the interactions with the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees, represent a highly stringent bordering practice. During the Dublin and 
the asylum interviews, migrants’ status is determined on the basis of their personal stories and 
migratory trajectories. One of the recurrent barriers mentioned by migrants in Germany and Hungary 
in their contact with public authorities is attributed to their lack of knowledge of local matters, 
combined with an absence of interpreters, which makes filling out forms or interacting with the 
authorities rather challenging.  
Similarly, in the Luxembourgish case, when asked to elaborate on their trajectories and the border-
crossings before arriving in Luxembourg, the migrants explicitly referred to mechanisms of control 
represented by natural borders (such as the sea or the mountains), physical materialisations (such as 
the Hungarian razor wire fence), or border agents. Most importantly (similarly to the German 
context), for the asylum seekers and refugees themselves, most of whom came to Luxembourg by 
land from Germany or France, borders emerged as physical barriers during their trajectories before 
arriving at the Luxembourgish border. The majority of informants were able to identify  specific 
crossings, such as in Serbia or Hungary, as the toughest borders, due to the violence of border agents 
or the presence of the razor wire fence. In contrast, crossing into Luxembourg was uneventful due to 
the absence of internal borders. As such, the interviewees distinguish between open borders (in the 
Schengen area), and closed borders (outside of the Schengen zone), the latter aiming at impeding 
their further mobilities through the use of physical obstacles or the border agents. Moreover, border 
crossing was inevitably related to a feeling of danger expressed by the participants, in situations such 
as the rough sea and strong winds when crossing the Aegean sea between Turkey and Greece, or the 
violence of border agents encountered at different border crossings.  
Nevertheless, once in Luxembourg, some participants referred to the complicated nature of 
administrative processes regarding the asylum process. Not only do bordering practices take place at 
the point of border-crossing, but also at the institutional level, when migrants enter in contact with 
organisations in charge with the application process, which in the Luxembourgish case is the Asylum 
Unit of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, where the filing, registration and lodging of the 
asylum application takes place. Moreover, the applicants are fingerprinted and their biometric data is 
checked against the EURODAC database. If the applicants are considered Dublin cases, they are sent 
to the emergency shelter Structure d’hébergement d’urgence au Kirchberg (SHUK), an open facility 
where the asylum seekers stay until they are transferred back to the first country of entry.  
While physical borders are often lived as a ‘given’, and the migrants do not ponder on them, the 
interaction with institutions is highly emotional. In their encounters with the Greek Asylum Service, 
asylum seekers and refugees express frustration due to the difficulty to get an appointment with the 
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Asylum service in Athens, long processing times (up to two years), and the interactions with the 
agents, who, in some cases, would not let the migrants take breaks during the interviews and would 
not offer any water.  
It follows that, in many cases, the possibility to enter the receiving countries due to the absence of 
borders in the Schengen area is followed by a filtering of populations which takes place within the 
nation-state, rather than outside of it, with many seeing their asylum applications rejected. In the 
French and German cases, even some of the asylum seekers who have an ongoing application, fear 
encounters with the police, which they either avoid or try to be nicely dressed in order to not catch 
any attention and be stopped and searched. As such, borders are not limited to border checks when 
entering EU countries, rather they carry on as barriers not only to status entitlement, but also to a 
fear free and self-assured existence in the host countries. Likewise, In Spain, borders are emerge 
once the territorial frontier has been crossed, and are represented by the fear of having one’s 
application rejected, uncertainty and long waiting times experienced in order to enter the reception 
and integration system.  
For national legislators and border agents, borders differentiate between ‘us’, who need to be 
protected, and ‘them’, who should be dissuaded from engaging in mobility. In their accounts of the 
role of borders surrounding the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, the majority of state actors interviewed 
across the seven case studies commented that borders are not always effective. Furthermore, the 
prevailing view is that the absence of border checks amongst the countries belonging to the 
Schengen area should result into tough controls at the external borders. In line with this, a border 
agent stated that the external border of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, situated at the airport, has 
the role of guaranteeing a high level of security for the Schengen area. As such, border controls are in 
place in order to protect the states belonging to the Schengen area, which, due to the freedom of 
movement in place, cannot perform border checks any longer. In this context, as emphasized by the 
majority of national institutional actors, sea borders are more difficult to manage than air or land 
borders, making the control of border crossings difficult to regulate and control. Given this, from an 
institutional perspective, bordering practices represent mechanisms of control which operate as 
filters, allowing in those entitled to do so and keeping out of the country people who are not allowed 
to engage in border crossing. However, in the case of ‘Dubliners’, their legality on Luxembourgish soil 
(similarly to other EU member states) is decided weeks or months after they entered the country. 
This indicates that the elimination of border controls at the point of entry into Luxembourg has been 
replaced by bordering practices taking place within Luxembourg, in order to give a judgement 
concerning migrants’ presence and thus status. 
3.7. Conclusion 
Taken together, these findings suggest that while for institutional actors borders represent 
mechanisms of control aiming at curtailing migrants’ movements, for the migrants themselves, they 
are an inevitable part of their journeys which may interfere with their trajectories, resulting in the 
use of alternative routes (such as the land route from Turkey to Greece rather than the sea route). 
Nonetheless, the shifting of border controls to become more physical (through the presence of walls 
and fences), is that migrants take new routes which are more dangerous, thus risking their lives.  
Furthermore, for most of the informants in the national studies, the legislative and administrative 
borders experienced within country during the asylum application were by far more emotionally 
intense than the physical borders encountered prior to arrival in the host country. This indicates that 
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the lack of internal borders in the EU has resulted in the creation of legislative and administrative 
borders within the EU Member States. The control of migrants’ identity and their right to stay in the 
country are therefore no longer determined at the point of entry in a country.  
The majority of institutional informants explicitly referred to the securitisation of external borders, 
particularly the maritime and land borderlines, in order to protect the EU area. At the EU level, the 
EU itself has also engaged in strengthening its external borders emphasizing the direct link between 
border checks and security (see Radjenovic 2019).  
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4. Mobility trajectories  
4.1. Introduction 
A focus on migrants’ journeys can provide new insights into the bordering process that the 
participants’ experience, as journeys traverse legal statuses, legal contexts and physical geographies. 
This allows us to study the experiences of those who have arrived physically, but wander 
administratively. It provides a lens to see beyond the departure/arrival and success/failure 
dichotomies. Indeed, the journey “as an experience with indeterminate beginnings and ends, 
transcends easy conceptual borders, as well as physical ones. (…) the concept encompasses imagined 
journeys before migration, journeys from countries of origin through countries of transit to 
destination, as well as deportation journeys” (Mainwaring and Brigden 2016:244). It is not just a linear 
process between departure and arrival, between two countries, but a fragmented journey (Collyer and 
King 2016:6), a “social process that shapes migrants and societies alike” (ibid:247). 
This chapter summarises the main findings with regards to the mobility of migrants in the seven 
countries in which fieldwork was conducted. As such, it examines the following issues: the country of 
transit/country of destination dichotomy, post-arrival mobility patterns and migrants’ mobility within 
the host societies.   
4.2. The country of transit/country of destination dichotomy  
The role that countries have during the trajectories of applicants for international protection change 
as a result of various factors, such as mechanisms of control in place, timing, reception conditions, 
degree of danger and the perceived reputation of a certain country. 
For example, traditionally, the two routes taken by migrants in order to arrive in Hungary have been 
by land Afghanistan – Iran – Turkey – Bulgaria-Serbia (and less so via Romania and Ukraine), and by 
sea and land, Turkey – Greece – Macedonia – Serbia. These two routes have been referred to by a 
border agent interviewed as the ‘Eastern Mediterranean illegal migration route’. Each route has its 
own challenges, with most migrants taking the land route being fingerprinted in Bulgaria and 
registered in EURODAC, which makes onward movement legislatively arduous, while the sea route is 
dangerous because of the deaths happening at sea. As such, if the sea route presents geographical 
challenges, the land route has its own administrative obstacles, as the migrants are identified as Dublin 
cases if they leave Bulgaria and risk being sent back. At the same time, the closure of Hungary’s external 
borders resulted into migrants changing their migratory routes and avoiding Hungary, to pass through 
Croatia and Slovenia.  
Similarly, some participants decided to come to Luxembourg because they could not reach the United 
Kingdom, showing that the presence of bordering practices deterred people from engaging in a 
perilous journey in order to arrive in the United Kingdom. However, most participants found out about 
Luxembourg once they arrived in Europe, from contacts met along the way. This shows that migrants’ 
mobility trajectories are not solely dependent on migrants’ encounters with borders, but also on the 
social encounters made. Moreover, among the asylum seekers and refugees interviewed in 
Luxembourg, France and Germany, it emerged that poor reception conditions in Italy and Greece 
convinced migrants to venture to Western Europe. Such is the case of a Libyan migrant currently in 
Greece, who first arrived in Italy and was supposed to wait for ten days in the reception facility before 
getting registered, but decided to leave after a week. 
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An implication of this is that countries do not fall under the traditional country of transit/country of 
destination typology, rather shifting in and out of this, depending on the cohort of migrants and 
political contexts. For example, Greece is not initially considered a country of destination, with most 
migrants considering continuing their journeys on to Germany. However, structural obstacles 
experienced in Greece with regards to the asylum process, as well as precarious or lack of 
accommodation, cloud their image of the whole of Europe, and acts as a deterrent to engage in further 
mobility. In contrast, for others, who have somewhat put down roots in Greece through activities such 
as studying, Greece is seen as ‘home’ at least until the end of the degree. This indicates that while for 
some immobility is voluntary, for others it is involuntary, due to the feeling of entrapment in Greece. 
This is due to the insecurity experienced administratively, but also to the difficulty of leaving the 
country as a result of the strengthening of border controls. For example, a Syrian couple having 
received asylum in Greece tried to leave Greece twice, but they were apprehended at the Athens 
airport the first time and in Vienna the second time, and sent back to Greece. This provides evidence 
of the complexity of migrants’ decisions in engaging in further mobilities. As such, Greece is a) an entry 
country to the EU, b) a destination country (in cases where people try unsuccessfully to leave the 
country), and c) a transit country for persons who successfully reach the wider Schengen area.  
Similarly, other countries such as Luxembourg and Spain are both countries of transit and destination. 
The physical location of Luxembourg, on the geographical route to the United Kingdom, makes it 
transit country for those who want to reach the UK, in addition to being a destination country for 
others. In the same way, Spain emerges as a transit country, with (mainly African) participants 
declaring that Spain represents a door to Europe, particularly if there are no job opportunities in the 
Spanish labour market. In contrast, a large number of Latin American participants are unlikely to 
consider engaging in onward movement, which might be due to the shared linguistic and cultural 
heritage, as well as climate and culinary traditions. Likewise, mainly a destination country, for an 
unprecedented number of asylum seekers, Germany was also considered a transit country in 2015 for 
around 83,000 migrants who went to Sweden, via the German-Danish border, instead of settling in 
Germany. 
4.3. Post arrival mobility patterns 
Based on the fieldwork carried out in the six EU countries and Turkey, one can distinguish between 
countries which facilitate onward mobility, and countries which restrict it.   
In the Spanish case, two main mobility trajectories have been identified by institutional actors from 
the Spanish borders on to other EU countries, pointing to the ‘country of transit’ that Spain has for 
some migrants. First, the trajectory sometimes used by Latin Americans consists of coming to Spain by 
plane, from where they board another plane to another EU country, a practice facilitated by the fact 
that they do not need a tourist visa to travel to Schengen countries. Secondly, the maritime border 
from the Basque Country (Bilbao port) often acts as a stepping stone for migrants wishing to go to the 
United Kingdom via the ports which have ferry lines to UK. The latter border enhances mobility, mainly 
because the migrants are not registered at the point of arrival in Spain. In contrast, asylum applicants 
in Melilla find themselves physically trapped on the territory for up to a year, time during which they 
are not allowed to go to the European continent, and do not enter the reception and integration 
system. As such, they stay in a Centre for Temporary Residence for Migrants. Although on Spanish 
territory, they are prevented from engaging in mobility to the mainland.  
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In the Luxembourgish case, both institutional actors and the migrants themselves refer to the 
commonplace aspect of cross-border mobility to the neighbouring countries (France, Belgium and 
Germany) for mundane activities such as grocery shopping or visiting family and friends, sometimes 
achievable even for asylum seekers, who are not allowed to leave Luxembourg until they receive the 
refugee status. While cross-border movements to the neighbouring countries are taken for granted 
due to the inexistence of borders, traveling further afield, such as to Turkey or Canada, is considered 
difficult, due to the need of a visa. In these situations, the practical use of holding a Luxembourgish 
passport is mentioned, as enhancing mobility. In the same way, for the participants interviewed in the 
Grand East region of France, mobility does not end once arrived in France, with many of those having 
received the refugee status having chosen to settle in Metz due to its proximity to Germany and 
Belgium, where they have family, or Luxembourg, for professional reasons. Working in Luxembourg 
emerged during several interviews with both asylum seekers and refugees, despite not being legally 
authorised to join the Luxembourgish labour market once the refugee status has been acquired in 
France.    
In contrast to the ordinary nature of mobility experienced by asylum seekers and refugees in 
Luxembourg and Eastern France, Greece manages the mobility of migrants through the presence of 
border controls at both entry and exit point, which have resulted into the reduction of secondary 
movements. However, the success of such operations is rather limited at the sea borders, while the air 
border is the easiest to control due to the presence of information technology, but very few 
arrivals/departures are registered at the Athens International Airport. Despite the easy management 
of air borders, and the fact that Greece is part of the Schengen area, it is important to note that 
passengers on flights from Greece to destinations considered popular for migrants, such as Belgium, 
Germany and Sweden, have their documents controlled at arrival, showing that internal borders are 
still present.  
In the Turkish context, various legal avenues are in place for migrants, asylum seekers and refugees to 
leave the country, however, the numbers of those benefiting from them are relatively low. 
Importantly, non-EU citizens have traditionally been granted conditional refugee or subsidiary 
protection statuses on a temporary basis, and would lose this status when they received the refugee 
status which would allow them to stay in Turkey until they are resettled to a third country, such as EU 
countries, or the US, Canada or Australia. The resettlement process has been the product of a 
partnership between the Turkish state and the UNHCR. With regards to the Syrians fleeing their 
country, they have been given Temporary Protection Status, which guarantees them basic rights, such 
as access to healthcare, education, as well as labour market participation. Secondly, the March 2016 
EU-Turkey Statement emerged as a response to the high numbers of irregular migrants sent back to 
Turkey from Greece. Under this statement, all irregular migrants crossing to Greece from Turkey after 
20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey; and for every Syrian being returned to Turkey, another 
vulnerable Syrian (as per the UN Vulnerability criteria) would be resettled to the EU, with most of them 
having been resettled in Germany, the Netherlands and France. Moreover, Turkey is bound to take 
measures “to prevent new sea and land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU” 
(European Commission 2016). From April 2016 until November 2016, over 1700 irregular migrants 
(mainly from Pakistan, Syria, Algeria, Bangladesh and Afghanistan) were returned to Turkey. Thus, 
Turkey is becoming a country of return. However, at the beginning of the influx of Syrians to Turkey, a 
high number of Syrians were choosing not to register in Turkey, to prevent being sent back to Turkey 
through the Readmission Agreement with the EU. By keeping their options open, albeit, living 
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irregularly in Turkey, they could have engaged in further mobility, without running the risk of being 
sent back to Turkey, once in the EU.  
A third path type of re-migration of migrants from Turkey is via the family reunification route, mainly 
to Germany. Finally, people with high social and economic capital engage in regular migration via 
professional or educational routes. However, it is worth mentioning that the above-mentioned legal 
routes to leave Turkey provide a fairly limited number of migrants with the opportunity to reach the 
EU. Thus, numerous asylum seekers leave for the EU irregularly, via Greece or Bulgaria, from cities like 
Canakkale, Izmir and Mugla.  
It has emerged that lack of employment prospects in Turkey has been considered as a factor triggering 
illegal further mobility to the EU. Interestingly, the alternative was also possible, with the French 
fieldwork illustrating a case of a Yemeni asylum seeker (who, in the meantime has been granted 
refugee status), who was regretting having come to France, where at the time of interview he was 
experiencing uncertainty with regards to his status. He detailed, with hindsight, that he would have 
chosen to stay in Turkey, where he was working, and not embark on a journey to Europe.  
In Germany, immobility is present in participants’ daily lives mainly with regards to their inability to 
travel to see their families, who are in Turkey. As well as the mobility itself, it is their agency which is 
undermined by not being allowed to travel. As such, most of them do not plan to engage in secondary 
movements, as that would mean having to start the integration process all over again. However, those 
who do consider leaving Germany, the reason evoked is related to the mobility restrictions in place for 
asylum seekers and refugees, but also to the presence of family or friends in other countries (such as 
Italy or the United Kingdom).  
4.4. Internal mobility  
As far as internal mobility is considered, it emerged that a common practice was the relocation of 
applicants for international protection. In Spain, people who do not have access to the reception and 
integration system in the city they first arrived in due to the lack of places, are relocated to other cities 
in Spain, thus disturbing the social networks the migrants were part of initially. Likewise, in France, 
refugees themselves requesting at times to be relocated to other parts of France where they have 
social and family networks. 
In contrast, in the German case, residence restrictions (which will be elaborated later) imposed by 
authorities during, and in many cases, after  the asylum procedure mean that mobility in Germany is 
frowned upon for both asylum seekers and refugees. As such, even participants who have a permanent 
employment, but live hours away from the work place are denied the right to move closer to the work 
place.  
Turning to migrants’ mobility within Turkey, similarly to Germany, Syrians with temporary protection 
status are required to reside in the localities they are allocated to or registered in. As such, in cases 
where they need to travel, they need to obtain a travel permission, which is a very administratively 
strenuous process, resulting in their mobility within Turkey being significantly curtailed, which presents 
significant challenges to their ability to find employment and work in jobs requiring overseas travel. 
Therefore, individuals with high socioeconomic capital, found in high skilled positions, prefer to apply 
for a residency permit, which offers them mobility rights, rather than the temporary protection status, 
which limits their stay to the city level. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
By showing that countries can be both countries of transit and receiving societies for different cohorts 
of people and at different point in time, depending on the political context, this chapter has disturbed 
the country of transit/country of destination dichotomy. Moreover, it identified that countries like 
France and Luxembourg, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other hand, are at opposite ends of 
the spectrum in terms of asylum seekers and refugees mobility. While cross-border mobility for 
persons with (or without, in some cases) refugee status is experienced as a mundane practice in France 
and Luxembourg, in Germany, peoples’ mobility is in many cases restricted to the level of the 
municipality.   
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5. The interplay between Schengen and Dublin 
5.1. Introduction 
This section is interested in the views of state actors and the experiences of migrants regarding the 
interaction between the Schengen and Dublin systems, which are crucial for an eventual reforms of 
CEAS.  
5.2. Schengen and Dublin – institutional views  
The interplay between the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation is of significant importance 
for the countries involved in this project representing the external borders of the EU, such as Greece 
(and to a lesser extent Spain). Greece, particularly, has come under pressure due to the large influx of 
asylum seekers, which put a strain on its border control. This resulted into migrants’ identifications 
and registrations not being consistently processed, triggering secondary movements within the 
Schengen area, which have been at the heart of discussions related to security. Indeed, in a 2016 press 
release, the European Commission stated “[s]ecuring the EU's external borders and ensuring efficient 
border controls is a prerequisite in an area of free movement“ (European Commission 2016b). 
In their accounts of the relation between the Schengen area and the Dublin Regulation, the 
institutional actors interviewed argued that Greece is currently experiencing a paradoxical reality. On 
the one hand, as a result of the absence of internal border checks, the Schengen system enables 
irregular migration and secondary movements. On the other hand, the Dublin Regulation is responsible 
for migrants’ staying in Greece, a country which would otherwise be considered mainly for transit 
purposes. As such, Dublin is the primary cause for Greece becoming a country of destination, as 
migrants are often legally trapped, meaning that they incur the risk of being returned to Greece, the 
first country of entry to the EU, in case they attempt to engage in secondary movements. While in 
Greece border agents see the Schengen area as a space which needs to be protected, in Spain, most 
institutional actors see Schengen as an open door towards other EU countries for the migrants having 
arrived in Spain. 
Unsurprisingly, most institutional actors interviewed were particularly critical of the application of the 
Dublin Regulation within an area characterised by the absence of internal borders. The Luxembourgish 
informants seem to be of the opinion that the Schengen agreement renders the Dublin regulation 
ineffective, as the migrants make use of the border free area. This means that the Dublin regulation is 
disregarded by the migrants themselves, who leave the first country of arrival, such as Greece and 
Italy, to come to Luxembourg. In other words, had Dublin worked, Luxembourg would have no asylum 
seekers, except the arrivals in the cases of responsibility sharing and solidarity, in which the Grand 
Duchy took in asylum seekers from ships such as Lifeline in July 2018.  
Amongst the state actors, there were also concerns regarding the securitisation of borders. In Hungary, 
most institutional actors claimed that the Schengen and Dublin regulations are not effective in the 
management of border security, as Dublin is considered to be putting pressure on (rather than 
benefiting) Member States which have an external border, such as Greece, Italy and Hungary. In this 
context, Schengen is considered to be working well if the external borders are protected effectively. 
As such, Hungarian officials consider the fence at the Hungarian external border to represent a 
solidarity and responsibility sharing mechanism, as not only do Hungarian border agents protect the 
Hungarian border, but also the EU member states internal borders.  
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5.3. Lived experiences of the interplay between the Schengen and Dublin systems 
From the perspective of migrants interviewed in Greece, Dublin is experienced as another obstacle 
during their migratory journeys, a border which is not insurmountable. It is not viewed as a regulation 
which is enforced, rather as a symbolical border of which they know, but does not impede their onward 
movements. Indeed, during fieldwork in Luxembourg, it became apparent amongst some asylum 
seekers interviewed, that the need to leave Greece because of poor reception conditions overcame 
the barriers imposed by the Dublin system.  
Two situations emerge with regards to the interaction between Schengen and Dublin in the French 
context, which has suppressed the Schengen agreement since November 2015. During the interviews 
with actors of the civil society, it became clear that, the Dublin regulation has had a negative impact 
on the asylum population, as France applies it in a consistent manner. The most striking example is 
that of the migrants trying to cross the Italian-French border, after having been fingerprinted in Italy. 
Those who manage to cross the border and reach France and are not detained by the French border 
police and returned to Italy, find themselves in limbo for up to a year in France, time during which their 
application is pending treatment. More often than not, male Dublin cases find themselves homeless, 
due to the precarious reception system which prioritises families and women due to the lack of places 
in accommodation centres. Another negative aspect of the Dublin regulation in France is that women, 
many of them who had been victims of sexual assault and violence and/or prostitution in Italy, fear 
being sent back. The existence of the Schengen area provides them with a fake illusion that their 
situation might improve, when, in reality, France applies Dublin, which means that they are waiting to 
be readmitted to the first country of arrival.   
Nevertheless, with regards to the Grand East region of France, where the fieldwork was conducted, 
the high levels of mobility experienced by the local population to and from the neighbouring countries 
means that, in practice, the suppression of Schengen would not be a viable solution in the long term. 
Therefore, cross border mobility becomes an inevitable solution for asylum seekers who have seen 
their applications rejected in France, and, as a result, decide to place their application in the nearby 
countries, such as Germany or Belgium. This is particularly the case of Roma families from Kosovo or 
Serbia, for whom mobility becomes ‘a way of living’. As such, with regards to the Grand East region, 
the non-existence of border controls undermines the implementation of the Dublin regulation. The 
two geographical examples above expose the inconsistent enforcement of Dublin across France by 
Prefectures, resulting in a high degree of divergence across the country. 
Similarly to France, in Germany, Dublin equals uncertainty, as asylum seekers are placed in a facility 
for up to six months, time during which they wait to be returned to the first country of arrival. In the 
German case, most of the times the transfer does not take place as the migrants are considered unfit 
for travel.  
With regards to  Turkey, the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation do not impact the Turkish 
border regime and the asylum management directly, nevertheless, they do so indirectly at least in two 
ways: 1) the appearance of new mobility trajectories through Turkey, and 2) the creation of legislation 
to account for this (the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement). One of the implications with regards to the 
migrants themselves has been that numerous refugees who should have been resettled to Spain or 
Italy opted to stay in Turkey instead, due to better living conditions. In this context, it is believed that 
if Schengen was indeed a borderless area, the migrants would have accepted to be resettled and, once 
in the EU, would have gone to the Nordic countries or Germany. This indicates that there are instances 
where the refugees themselves perceive borders between countries belonging to the Schengen area.  
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5.4. The Common European Asylum System 
With regards to CEAS, most actors agreed that the main stumbling block at its heart is the lack of 
solidarity and responsibility-sharing mechanisms between member states in the context of Dublin, as 
the EU member states show little solidarity towards Greece and Italy, in not taking a share of asylum 
seekers. The Hungarian actors, however, considered that, for CEAS to be effective, it should take into 
account the reality of the Schengen area, which is the absence of borders, by processing all asylum 
applications either in non-EU nation states, or at EU’s external borders. This would prevent secondary 
movements, as has already been the case due to the presence of transit centres at Hungary’s external 
border, which have prevented movements to Austria. Therefore, from their perspective, the 
enforcement of border security at the Hungarian external border protects the EU member states. 
Some actors also referred to the procedures in place, which should be enforced. It has been reported 
that Spain tried to follow the legal framework, however, due to the high numbers of arrivals, the 
system collapsed, and it has adjusted its practices to apply a version of CEAS with its own national take. 
One of the question marks of the asylum policy is, for example, the actual registration of the migrants 
who arrive in Spain, as many remain unfingerprinted. In this context, there have been cases where 
migrants were bussed to the North of the country (Catalonia and the Basque Country), from where 
they undertook onward migration, without having been registered in Spain. A similar practice was 
mentioned in the Luxembourgish case, with institutional actors denouncing that Italian authorities 
would shuttle asylum seekers to the North of the country, and let them go to the neighbouring 
countries, many Eritreans choosing to come to Luxembourg. 
In a similar vein, the German legislators stress the importance of the harmonisation of European 
asylum systems, namely the asylum procedure, criteria for determining refugee status, legal protection 
and a common list of safe countries of origin. Thus, rather than directives, CEAS should be comprised 
of an Asylum Procedures Regulation and a Reception Conditions Regulation, which should be binding. 
The harmonisation of reception conditions (with focus on standardisation of accommodation rather 
than of asylum allowance) might also deter migrants from engaging in secondary movement, however, 
it is difficult to achieve due to heterogeneous economic and political contexts. An option for preventing 
secondary movements might be by connecting asylum and labour migration by distributing asylum 
seekers to countries based on their skills and the national labour market needs. 
5.5. Conclusion 
From the perspective of state actors, the reality of Schengen and Dublin is that first countries of arrival 
(such as Greece and Spain) as well as destination countries of secondary migration (such as Germany) 
are at the receiving end of migrant numbers, while other EU countries do not show any solidarity in 
the matter. Furthermore, it is considered that while the freedom of movement of EU citizens is 
important for European integration, the Dublin procedure is necessary in order to reduce the negative 
effects of open internal borders, such as secondary movements of asylum seekers. Despite being a 
good tool in theory, in practice the Dublin regulation is considered to have failed, as in many countries, 
asylum seekers are not registered, which means that since there is no administrative paper trail of 
them, they cannot be returned to the first country of arrival. A second pitfall of the Dublin regulation 
consists of the non-execution of readmissions of migrants, as, in many case, the deadline expires. 
To conclude, migrants leave the first countries of arrival irrespective of the Dublin agreement, showing 
that borders cannot always prevent mobility. Dublin represents just another border they need to cross. 
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6. Housing and Employment  
6.1. Introduction 
As previously argued, borders are produced and reproduced. In the process, they become materialised 
in peoples’ daily lives through the actions of different border managers, may they be public, private or 
non-governmental. In-country, border controls therefore take the form of barriers upon migrants, 
curtailing their access to services, rights and mobility on the basis of their migrant status.   
6.2. Housing 
Across the six European countries studied, Greece, Hungary and Spain present a severe shortage of 
housing. In Greece, where only asylum seekers are eligible for accommodation, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is one of the main actors in the housing market, as 
accommodation programmes are implemented by it through the ESTIA programme, with the support 
of NGOs. However, provided that the facilities are full, in some cases,  it can take more than ten months 
for asylum seekers to be placed in a camp, with some resorting to finding accommodation alternatives 
through personal contacts (by staying with friends already in private accommodation) or with the 
support of NGOs. There is a total of 26 open reception facilities (mainly camps in the outskirts of 
Athens, but also some hotels) coordinated by the Ministry for Migration Policy. Camps are situated on 
the outskirts of Athens, which might exacerbate the feeling of exclusion. The housing shortage, as well 
as the difficulty to access private housing due to high costs, has changed the landscape of Athens, 
triggering the appearance of squats.  
Similarly, in Hungary, there is very limited accommodation for asylum seekers, and there are no 
housing options dedicated strictly to refugees. Beneficiaries of international protection can stay in 
refugee centres for a period of 30 days after their status has been granted. Once this period is up, the 
only options available are either social housing structures or homeless shelters, which are extremely 
difficult to navigate without the help of contacts and/or linguistic skills. Therefore, private housing 
remains the only viable alternative, despite barriers such as price and discrimination.  
Access to the Spanish reception and integration system (covering education, healthcare, citizen 
awareness, housing and labour markets) is dependent on the number of places available and it consists 
of two phases: the temporary phase (which lasts for six months), and the phase of autonomy. The 
system is open to those having placed an asylum application and it is also available in case they are 
granted international protection (ECRE n.d). Despite the asylum legislation guaranteeing access to 
housing to asylum seekers as part of the reception and integration system, shortage of accommodation 
represents the main negative aspects to which migrants are confronted, meaning that over 80% of 
asylum seekers do not have access to accommodation. During the temporary phase, asylum applicants 
are hosted in asylum reception centres. After this phase, they enter the autonomy phase, meaning 
that they are meant to look for accommodation, with some financial support provided by civil 
organisations. Nonetheless, the lack of affordable housing in the private sector and of social housing, 
as well as discrimination, are only a couple of the barriers encountered by migrants when looking for 
accommodation. As such, those falling through the cracks of the system, left with no accommodation 
options, end up living in temporary homeless shelters, in shared accommodation, or allowed to sleep 
for a certain number of nights in churches or NGOs, or are ultimately left homeless. 
In Luxembourg asylum seekers are placed in shelters which are under the responsibility of the 
Luxembourgish Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI), and are managed either by OLAI itself, or by 
 27 
 
the Luxembourgish Red Cross or Caritas. Like in the Greek case, many shelters are located in relatively 
isolated places, with limited access to public transport, which impeded respondents’ mobility within 
the country. There are no shelters aimed at refugees, who are supposed to leave the accommodation 
facilities aimed for applicants for international protection after their refugee status has been granted. 
However, due to obstacles at accessing accommodation in the private market (due to high rental prices 
and/or discrimination), many extend their stay in the facilities after the refugee status has been 
granted, or resort to social contacts in order to find private accommodation.  
In France, asylum seekers are, in theory, placed in housing structures in shelters, hotels or apartments. 
However, the acute shortage of accommodation places means that there is often no accommodation 
available particularly for single male asylum seekers, who are not considered as vulnerable as women 
and families. Therefore, asylum seekers and refugees (who often live in social housing) are often 
relocated to areas where accommodation is available. Similarly, in Germany, after the asylum 
procedure has been finalised in the first reception centres, asylum seekers are distributed to 
municipalities on the basis of a quota. In municipalities, they are usually placed in shared 
accommodation until a decision has been made on their case, after which they need to find 
accommodation by themselves. The collective accommodation also determines their place of 
residence, as it is difficult to move out of the municipality. Refugees who receive social welfare 
transfers have access to affordable housing which needs to meet specific financial and size 
requirements. As such, it took some participants up to a year to find an apartment, which sometimes 
can be in poor condition. As well as housing shortages for large families and single people, foreigners 
also often experience discrimination from the side of landlords or estate agents, which has led to many 
NGOs providing support in finding accommodation. Moreover, most of the social housing is found 
outside of city centres, while refugees prefer to live in cities.  
Restrictions to persons’ internal mobility takes place also in the Turkish case. Both Syrians under 
temporary protection and asylum seekers are required to live in cities in which they are allocated to 
or are registered in. In this context, temporary accommodation centres are seen, from the perspective 
of institutional actors, as obstructing social harmonisation, which should be enhanced by migrants 
living in permanent accommodation. As such, camps have closed down, and the Syrians removed were 
given financial support in order to find accommodation in the cities in which they were registered in 
the first place. However, most accommodation options for both Syrians and asylum seekers rely on 
self-financed accommodation in the city in which they have been assigned. In cases where they want 
to move to different cities, they need to obtain an authorization from the PDMM on health or family 
grounds, otherwise they might fall into irregularity.  
6.3. Employment 
In all the European countries studied, asylum seekers and refugees have the right to work, although 
applicants for international protection generally need to be in possession of an authorisation before 
taking up work. Asylum seekers in Luxembourg, Spain and France can apply for temporary work 
authorisation if no decision has been made on their asylum application after six months, while refugees 
have the right to work and full access to the labour market. In the Spanish case, the work authorisation 
has to be renewed every six months, but, because of long processing delays, sometimes they are left 
with expired work documents, making it impossible to find work. Moreover, the stigma associated with 
the work authorisation and thus the asylum system, means that employers are reluctant to hire asylum 
seekers. Programmes offered by NGOs promote access to the labour market by offering 3,000€ per 
year to those who take part in the programme for training and job placement courses offered by civil 
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organisations. Nevertheless, in practice, there is not enough funding to cover all the requests. Other 
than the lack of funding, other barriers that asylum seekers encounter in the access to the labour 
market are the recognition of degrees and experience, as well as linguistic barriers for non-Hispanic 
asylum seekers.  
Nevertheless, various obstacles limit asylum seekers’ and refugees’ participation in the labour market, 
such as: lack of language skills or local professional experience, or invalidity of the qualifications 
obtained in home countries. Thus, their labour market participation is relatively low, and/or in low 
skilled positions in the hospitality sector. Several refugees in Luxembourg and France in employment, 
as well as jobless asylum seekers at the time of the research, declared having done volunteering, which 
might have improved their hiring prospects through local experience and the creation of a network.   
In Hungary and Germany, the access of asylum seekers to work is somewhat facilitated from an 
administrative point of view. In Hungary, they have the right to work in refugee centres for up to nine 
months as kitchen aides or cleaners, or to do community work without being in the possession of a 
work permit, after which they need to apply for one. Due to high emigration rates and economic 
growth, prospective employers often contact NGOs active in the field of asylum in order to provide a 
labour force from amongst the refugee population, however, most employment opportunities are in 
low skilled jobs, such as cooks in kebab, gyros shops and pizzerias. However, there is no support 
targeting asylum seekers and refugees in order to facilitate their labour market integration.  
In Germany, most asylum seekers (except those from safe countries) can receive a work permit three 
months after they started the asylum procedure. Refugees receive it automatically and are also 
allowed to work as self-employed. However, since asylum seekers must stay in first reception centres 
during the asylum procedure, they become immobile and thus often unable to take up employment. 
Another barrier to the access to the labour market, which seems unique to Germany, consists of the 
level of education. People who are not in possession of a secondary school degree do not have access 
to vocational education, which would enhance their labour market participation as a result of the 
potential to gain professional and linguistic skills. 
In Turkey, people holding different international protection statuses can apply and be granted work 
permits. For example, conditional refugees are able to enter the employment market upon receiving 
a work permit, while refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection can use their identity cards to 
access the labour market. Legislation surrounding the access to the labour market for people under 
temporary protection has been in place as of 2016, allowing people to receive work permits at the 
request of the employer six months after obtaining this status. Despite the regulation surrounding and 
enabling access to the formal market, the largest part of the working population is found in the 
informal sector. This is due to three main reasons: 1) the absence of benefits associated with working 
legally (as free healthcare is already provided), 2) the fact that employers need to make the application, 
(in the case of Syrians under temporary protection), 3) earning an income would not make them 
eligible to receive the monthly allowance provided as part of the UN-backed Emergency Social Safety 
Net programme for Syrians in Turkey. With regards to experiences in the informal labour market, it 
has been found that nearly all participants have experienced instances of exploitation, which took the 
form of unequal pay for the same type of work as Turkish nationals.  
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter determined that while in all of the national cases access to employment for applicants for 
international protection was granted upon application for a work authorisation, barriers such as 
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discrimination and non-recognition of home country qualification represented the main barriers to 
labour market participation. With regards to the housing market, shortage of accommodation facilities 
meant that, in many cases, asylum seekers had to live either with friends, or in the outskirts of cities, 
which might impede their social and economic integration.  
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7. Final conclusion 
The aim of this comparative study was to examine the interplay between borders and mobility from 
the perspective of migrants and state, as well as non-state actors in six EU countries (Greece, Hungary, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg, Spain) and Turkey. The first chapter introduced the theoretical and 
methodological dimensions of the research, while the second chapter contextualised the empirical 
data by providing some information on the management of EU borders, the CEAS, and the national 
asylum legislation in place in each of the countries studied. The empirical component of this study was 
based on fieldwork conducted in the seven national contexts listed above. It consists of four chapters, 
which explored, from the perspective of institutional actors and migrants, the following themes: 
borders, mobility trajectories and patterns, the interplay between the Schengen area and the Dublin 
Regulation, and access to the labour and housing market.  
This comparative study has identified that the majority of state actors interviewed by the national 
partners expressed concerns with regards to the applicability of the Dublin system in an area 
characterised by the absence of borders, arguing that the lack of internal borders renders the Dublin 
package ineffective. This emerged particularly in the interviews conducted in Luxembourg, where the 
national legislators commented that a landlocked country like Luxembourg, with the airport being the 
only external border, was a destination country for applicants for international protection due to the 
absence of internal borders. In a similar vein, from the perspective of the migrants interviewed, the 
existence of the Dublin Regulation does not prevent their mobility trajectories. Nevertheless, it 
exposes them to a state of legal uncertainty when arriving in a Member State which was not the first 
EU country of arrival. This suggests that for many of the migrants interviewed, the mobility trajectories 
undergone in order to arrive in the ‘destination countries’, become legal and administrative journeys 
within the receiving countries, in order to become regularised.  
One possible solution identified by the public actors was the securing of external borders (particularly 
the maritime borders), considered significant in counteracting the effects of the border free Schengen 
area, as it would prevent people from entering the EU. Nevertheless, the research conducted in the 
field suggests that borders cannot always prevent human mobility. While at times they can deter 
people from travelling to the destination countries initially targeted, this study has found that borders 
can mostly change mobility trajectories, resulting either in the creation of new migratory routes and 
the increase in popularity of some routes over others, and/or the transformation of some Member 
States from countries of transit into countries of destination. For example, in late 2015 and 2016, when 
Germany lifted the border control and became the country responsible with examining asylum 
applications, the Greek-North Macedonia border became popular for people heading to Germany. 
However, when Germany closed its borders and the hotspot approach was introduced, many people 
decided to stay in Greece. This suggests that while borders might impede people from arriving in the 
countries of reception originally contemplated, they cannot prevent people from engaging in 
migratory/secondary movements.  
Related to this, it was found that in some cases, although the ‘migrants’ did not consider going to a 
certain country of destination when leaving the country of origin, the social encounters made 
throughout their journeys, convinced them about the choice of one country over the other. For 
example, several participants interviewed in Luxembourg declared having only found out about the 
existence of the country after having arrived in Europe. This shows that mobility patterns are not 
 31 
 
necessarily a response to border controls, but also to other factors, such as the presence of 
acquaintances and friends. 
One of the main weaknesses of the Dublin Regulation is that despite the first country of arrival criteria, 
most applicants for international protection do not seek asylum in the first EU Member State they 
arrived in. Moreover, many of the asylum claims lodged in EU Member States are made by applicants 
who have already made an application in a different EU country. This indicates that the Dublin criteria 
for examining asylum claims does not take into account applicants’ preferences. The current study 
found that the main ‘pull factors’ which (might) determine applicants for international protection, as 
well as beneficiaries for international protection to engage in secondary movements are represented 
by the presence of family and social networks, (perceived) work opportunities in a different EU 
Member State and precarious reception conditions in the first countries of arrival (such as Italy and 
Greece).  
If we now turn to ‘migrants’’ experiences in the labour and housing market in the countries studied, 
with the exception of Germany and Hungary, access to employment is determined by the granting of 
a temporary work authorisation six months after having lodged an asylum application. In the German 
context, the time frame is reduced to three months, while in Hungary work authorisations are not 
necessary for the first nine months. Nevertheless, barriers such as non-recognition of degrees and 
work experience, as well as absence of language skills and local work experience mean that access to 
the labour market is often restricted. This is a compelling finding, since access to the labour market is 
one of the determinants for secondary movements. Furthermore, it was found that precarious 
conditions experienced in structures of initial reception might both encourage and discourage asylum 
seekers’ secondary movements, which points to the importance of studying onward movements from 
a holistic perspective, by looking at migrants’ everyday experience, rather than in specific areas, such 
as the housing and employment sectors.  
To conclude, this study indicates that while territorial borders cannot always impede human mobility, 
their in-country reproductions can encourage migrants’ secondary movements.  
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9. List of Abbreviations 
CEAS - Common European Asylum System  
CEASEVAL - Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and 
Recommendations for Further Development 
EU - European Union 
EURODAC – European fingerprinting database 
FRONTEX – European Border and Coast Agency 
GDM - General Direction of MigrationOAR - Office of Asylum and Refuge   
OFPRA  - Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides OFPRA 
PDMM - Provincial Directorate of Migration Management 
SIS – Schengen Information System 
SHUK - Structure d’hébergement d’urgence au Kirchberg  
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
VIS – Visa Information System  
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